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Abstract
New genotypes of influenza A virus arise quickly and frequently around the world
due to continued mutation and reassortment. Novel influenza A viruses pose a direct
threat to immunologically naïve humans. A prime example is the recent emergence
of avian-origin H7N9 viruses that have become enzootic in China. Three waves of the
H7N9 breakout that began in March 2013 have resulted in 571 human cases and over
212 deaths as of 23 February 2015. Real-time influenza surveillance at the wild bird–
human interface is essential to limit the outbreak in scale and geographic distribution
and to understand the pandemic potential of the H7N9 avian influenza.
Influenza A viruses continue to evolve via several mechanisms, especially by point
mutation and reassortment [1], which conduce to the emergence of new strains with
epidemic or pandemic potential. In the last 100 years, influenza A viruses have
transmitted to and spread among humans, resulting in at least four pandemics [2].
These outbreaks lead to huge economic losses. The recent outbreak of H7N9 viruses
following the pandemic spread of 2009 pandemic influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus has
caused more than 600 human infections, with nearly 30% mortality (http://
www.who.int/influenza/human_animal_interface/influenza_h7n9/en/). Multiple
distinct lineages of H7N9 viruses have established in chickens [3]. Of note, the
increasing epidemiological evidences indicated that H7N9 viruses have limited
transmissibility in a family cluster [4]. Therefore, a comprehensive understanding of
the mechanisms that determine viral transmissibility, pathogenicity, and evolution is
of importance for pandemic preparedness.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Influenza A viruses
Influenza A viruses belong to the family Orthomyxoviridae. The genome of influenza A
viruses is comprised of eight segments of single-stranded, negative-sense RNA. The total
genome size is about 13,588 bases. There are two viral surface glycoproteins, hemagglutinin
(HA) and neuraminidase (NA), in the viral membrane. On the basis of the antigenic variation
of the HA and NA, influenza A viruses were classified into different subtypes. Thus far, 18
HA subtypes (H1–H18) and 11 NA subtypes (N1–N11) have been detected in the wild [5]. In
theory, influenza A viruses can yield up to 198 combinations. Currently, investigation
confirmed that more than nine combinations (H3N2, H1N1, H5N1, H7N7, H7N9, H5N6,
H10N8, H2N2, and H9N2) were able to infect humans (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Phylogenetic trees of surface genes of all subtypes of influenza A viruses. The rooted phylogenetic tree was
generated based on a full-length nucleotide sequence comparison among influenza A viruses. The representative se‐
quence of each subtype was obtained from the Influenza Virus Resource of NCBI for multiple alignments, and the
phylogenetic tree was generated by the ClustalW algorithm in Mega version 6.0 using UPGMA method. The bootstrap
values are given at each node. Animal symbols denote the host of influenza A viruses. Subtypes of influenza A viruses
have been identified in different hosts, as indicated: blue, birds; red, human; purple, pig; cyan, bat; green, horse.
The genome of influenza A viruses can code for up to 14 proteins [6], which are involved in
the influenza virus life cycle [7]. HA mediates the binding to the receptors on host cells and
the fusion of the virus and host cell membranes for vRNA release into the cytoplasm. NA is
responsible for the efficient release of progeny viruses from infected cells. Replication and
transcription and viral RNAs (vRNP) are carried out by the ribonucleoprotein complexes
(RNPs) containing three polymerase proteins, basic polymerase 2 (PB2), basic polymerase 1
(PB1), and acidic polymerase (PA), and the nucleocapsid protein (NP). The PB1 also encodes
other polypeptides in overlapping open reading frames: PB1-F2 and PB1-N40. PB1-F2 protein,
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encoded by the +1 reading frame of PB1, functions to kill host immune cells, responding to
influenza virus infection [8]. The role of PB1-N40 is associated with PB1 and PB1-F2 [9]. PA
gene can code a previously unknown PA-X, which functions to repress cellular gene expression
[10]. M1 is the viral matrix structural protein and the ion-channel protein M2 is incorporated
in the viral membrane. M42 was identified, which functionally complements M2 [11]. NS gene
encodes two proteins: xlinkand NEP. xlink is an interferon antagonist that blocks the activation
of transcription factors and NEP is involved in the nuclear export of RNPs into the cytoplasm
before virus assembly. The roles of HA and PB2 proteins in viral transmissibility are discussed
in more detail later.
2. Highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses
On the basis of the virulence in chickens, influenza A viruses of the H5 and H7 subtypes can
be divided into highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) and low-pathogenic avian influenza
(LPAI) viruses. In the field, a few H5 and H7 subtype avian influenza viruses are the HPAI
phenotype. In general, HPAI viruses are considered to emerge in poultry infected by LPAI
viruses. Since 1997, when it was first reported in Hong Kong [12, 13], the highly pathogenic
avian influenza A(H5N1) viruses have spread through wild and domestic bird populations
across Asia and into Europe, the Middle East, and Africa [14]. Currently, HPAI Asian-origin
H5N1 viruses have become endemic in poultry in six countries (Bangladesh, China, Egypt,
India, Indonesia, and Vietnam) [15].
H5N1 viruses continue to undergo dynamic evolution [14]. HPAI A(H5N1) viruses have
resulted in outbreaks in waterfowl, the natural reservoir of influenza A viruses [16]. Ten years
since highly pathogenic Asian-origin avian influenza A (H5N1) viruses began to infect
migratory waterfowl in Qinghai Lake in western China in 2005 [16, 17], there is an unprece‐
dented panzootic in more than 63 countries across three continents [18]. They have led to severe
economic damage to poultry industry, and have transmitted to humans with lethal conse‐
quences. As of 31 March 2015, 826 human infections with 440 deaths have been reported in 16
countries (http://www.who.int/influenza/human_animal_interface/EN_GIP_201503031
cumulativeNumberH5N1cases.pdf?ua=1). Compared with seasonal influenza epidemics and
the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, the Asian-origin HPAI H5N1 virus is strikingly severe and fatal,
with 52.3% mortality rate. Although several family clusters of H5N1 virus infection have been
reported [19], sustained human-to-human infection has not been detected.
Several studies indicated that HPAI Asian-origin H5N1 viruses that are capable of respiratory
droplet transmission among mammals can be generated by mutation and reassortment. Herfst
et al. introduced two well-known substitutions (Q226L, G228S in H3 HA numbering) in the
receptor-binding site (RBS) of HA and a well-known glutamic acid (Glu) to lysine substitution
at position 627 (E627K) of PB2 into a human-origin H5N1 isolate [20]. The H5N1 mutant
acquired the ability to be transmitted by airborne transmissible among ferrets by further
acquiring substitutions after serial passage [20]. Linster et al. stated that two sets of five
mutations are identified (E627K in PB2; H99Y in PB1; H103Y, T156A, and either Q222L or
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G224S in HA), either of which is sufficient to confer ferret transmissibility on a human H5N1
isolate. Using a combination method, a reassortant H5 HA/H1N1 virus—comprising H5 HA
(from an H5N1 virus) with four mutations and the remaining seven gene segments from a 2009
pandemic H1N1 virus—was transmissible between ferrets by respiratory droplet [21]. In
contrast, Zhang et al. created many transmissible H5N1 hybrid viruses derived from a lethal
H5N1 virus and a 2009 pandemic influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus among guinea pigs [22].
However, sustained human-to-human transmission of Asian-origin H5N1 virus has not yet
been confirmed in the field.
3. Swine-origin 2009 H1N1 influenza viruses
An outbreak of influenza-like respiratory illness started in a Mexican town in mid-February
2009 [23]. By the end of April, WHO raised repeatedly the influenza alert level from phase 3
to phase 4, and finally, to phase 6 (the pandemic phase) due to the rapid spread of this virus
around the world. Most of reported cases outside Mexico and the United States were induced
by travelers from both countries. As of May 30, 2010, more than 214 countries across seven
continents had reported laboratory confirmed cases of pandemic influenza H1N1 2009,
including over 18,138 deaths (http://www.who.int/csr/don/2010_06_04/en/). These viruses had
a mortality rate comparable to that of seasonal influenza virus. Currently, influenza
A(H1N1)pdm09 continues to circulate as a seasonal virus (http://www.who.int/csr/disease/
swineflu/notes/briefing_20100810/en/).
Complete genomic coding sequences indicated influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses emerged
from three origins by means of genetic reassortment (i.e., avian/human/swine “triple”
reassortants) [24]. These viruses possess avian-origin PB2 and PA genes, a human-origin PB1
gene, and swine-origin HA (H1), NP, NS, NA (N1), and M genes. The human-origin PB1 gene
and the avian-origin PB2 and PA genes have been circulating in pigs [7]. However, the factors
that contribute to the genesis of influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses remain to be determined.
4. Outbreak of avian-origin H7N9 viruses in China
On 31 March 2013, the national health and family planning commission of China (NHFPCC)
first reported human infections caused by a novel avian-origin avian influenza A(H7N9) virus
[25]. On April 5, 2013, the Ministry of Agriculture of China first isolated this virus in poultry
at an agricultural wholesale market in Shanghai [26]. Since the initial report, three waves of
this flu have coursed through the country. Currently, H7N9 viruses have become enzootic in
China.
Epidemiological investigations of human cases by the avian influenza A(H7N9) virus showed
that most of patients had a history of recent exposure to poultry or a visit to live poultry market,
suggesting a close relationship between live poultry market and the spread of flu [27]. The
source of avian influenza A(H7N9) virus was immediately traced to live poultry market. After
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the implementation of compulsory shutdown measures in avian influenza A(H7N9) virus–
positive live poultry markets, the government quickly controlled the spread of the virus.
However, the elimination of avian influenza A(H7N9) virus is a huge and long-term challenge
due to its avirulent nature in poultry.
Phylogeny analysis indicated that the novel avian influenza A (H7N9) virus resulted from the
reassortment of recent avian H7N3 viruses and HX(2 or 11)N9 influenza viruses with avian
influenza A (H9N2) viruses originated from two different groups [28]. As a result, these viruses
possess an HA gene of duck-origin H7N3 virus, an NA gene of migratory bird-origin HX(2 or
11)N9 virus, and the remaining six viral genes (PB2, PB1, PA, NP, M, and NS) of H9N2 viruses.
However, important questions are when, where, and how the avian influenza A (H7N9)
viruses are established in poultry and transmitted to humans in China.
The novel avian influenza A(H7N9) virus has several remarkable features. First, this virus has
resulted in lethal infections in human and mammalian species, but this virus was low patho‐
genic for poultry including chickens [29]. Second, this virus possessed a truncated NA protein
with a deletion of five amino acids in the stalk, which was associated with virus virulence [30,
31]. Third, some H7N9 human isolates have a naturally occurring Q226L substitution in the
receptor-binding site HA, a pivotal site for the switch of binding receptor [30, 31]. Fourth, PB2
proteins from some human H7N9 isolates have mutations Lys at positions 627 and Asn at 701
[30, 31], whereas the PB2 proteins from bird H7N9 isolates retain Glu at position 627 and Asp
at 701. They are important for viral replication at the upper airway of mammalian hosts [32,
33]. These findings suggested that the mutation is positively selected upon replication in the
human host.
5. Role of HA in cross-species transmission
HA has a major role in the interspecies transmission of influenza A viruses. The HA of human
influenza virus (e.g. influenza A(H1N1)pdm09) preferentially recognizes sialic acid linked to
galactose by 6-linkages (Siaa2,6Gal) (human-type receptor), whereas the HA of avian-origin
influenza A virus preferentially binds to sialic acid linked to galactose by 2,3-linkages
(Siaa2,3Gal) (avian-type receptor). The receptor-binding properties of HA are determined by
the amino acid residues in the receptor-binding pocket, which creates microenvironment
responsible for viral binding to receptor of host cells. Viruses with leucine (Leu) at position
226 and serine (Ser) at position 228 preferentially bind to human-type receptors, whereas those
with glutamine (Gln) and glycine (Gly) at these positions bind to avian-type receptors [34, 35].
Glycan microarray analysis by using a solid-phase binding assay with receptor analogs,
revealed that highly pathogenic avian-origin H5N1 virus, in general, specifically binds the
avian receptor [34]. When two amino acid substitutions (Q226L and G228S) were introduced
in the receptor-binding site (RBS) of H5 HA, highly pathogenic avian-origin H5N1 virus
acquired an increased ability to bind to human-type receptors [34], which was due to a cis/
trans conformational change in the glycosidic linkage [36]. Several reports have showed that
a change of receptor specificity from avian-type receptor to human-type receptor is important
for conferring airborne transmission on avian-origin H5N1 virus among mammals [20, 37].
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Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus naturally binds the human receptor [38]. This virus is
transmissible virus among humans. In the direct glycan receptor-binding assay, the HA of
influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus exhibited a dose-dependent binding to human-type receptors.
Zhang et al. revealed that glutamine at position 226 of HA is a key factor on the transmissibility
of influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus between mammals [39].
Receptor-binding properties of avian influenza A(H7N9) viruses are diverse. Some H7N9
viruses preferentially bind the avian receptor analog, whereas some have dual receptor-
binding property [29, 40-42]. Avian influenza A(H7N9) virus can retain dual receptor prop‐
erties, although a naturally occurring Q226L of the HA, a pivotal amino acid that mediates
receptor-binding specificity was mutated [41], suggesting other factors of avian influenza
A(H7N9) virus are probably involved in the receptor-binding specificity. Two substitutions
(Q226L and G228S) in the host receptor-binding protein HA contributed to a switch in receptor
specificity of an avian H7N9 isolate from dual receptor property to human receptor-binding
property (unpublished data). H7N9 influenza virus that binds both avian and human receptor
analogs can be transmissible by respiratory droplet among ferrets [29, 40]. However, the
transmissibility of this virus is limited and unsustained [4, 40].
6. Role of PB2 in viral transmissibility
The amino acid at position 627 of the PB2 protein is important for airborne transmission of
influenza A viruses among mammals. Influenza A viruses with lysine (Lys) at residue 627 of
PB2 protein, but not those possessing glutamic acid (Glu) at this position, increased virus
replication in mammalian cells at relatively low temperatures [33]. Lys at residue 627 of PB2
is one of five substitutions that proved to be sufficient to confer transmissibility on H5N1 virus
[37]. The amino acid at residue 627 of PB2 could increase polymerase activity [37]. In fact, lysine
to glutamic acid substitution at position 627 (E627K) of the PB2 could reduce the transmissi‐
bility of human influenza viruses [43].
The substitution Glu to Lys in the PB2 proteins at position 627 was positively selected upon
replication in human host. In general, the PB2 proteins from human-origin isolates have Lys
at position 627, whereas those of viruses isolated from birds retain Glu at this position. The
strong selection has been reported previously for influenza A(H7N7), A(H5N1), and novel
A(H7N9) infections. For example, the PB2 proteins from most of human H7N9 isolates at
positions 627 are Lys. In contrast, the PB2 proteins from H7N9 viruses isolated from birds
retain Glu [44].
7. Other proteins in viral transmissibility
The viral ribonucleoprotein (RNP) complex—consisting of the polymerase proteins PB2, PB1,
PA, and NP—is one of the most important mechanisms for replication, pathogenticity, and
transmissibility of influenza A virus [45]. The levels of RNP activity at 33° and 37°C have an
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important correlation with virus replication in the upper and lower respiratory tracts of
mammalians [32, 33]. Previous studies indicated that high replication efficiency of influenza
A virus in the upper respiratory of mammalian host tract contributed to viral transmission
between mammalians [32, 33].
Avian-origin H5N1 virus could acquire an essential substitution (His to Tyr) at position 99 of
PB1 after serial passage, which was associated with airborne transmission among ferrets [37].
The substitution in PB1 contributed to polymerase transcription and virus replication [20, 37].
Zhang et al. suggested that PA protein and NS protein played a critical role in the airborne
transmission between guinea pigs [46]. Therefore, airborne transmission of avian influenza
A(H5N1) virus remains a polygenic trait. Transmission of avian influenza A(H7N9) virus also
is a polygenic trait [29].
8. Prevention and control
For the treatment of influenza A virus infections, two classes of antiviral drugs—M2 ion
channel inhibitors and neuraminidase inhibitors—are at present approved for the control of
viral infection. However, the emergence of drug-resistant strains is a challenge. Amantadine
and rimantadine are licensed for use against influenza A viruses. However, many strains from
multiple subtypes of influenza A virus are now resistant to two available antiviral drugs [7].
Based on a serine to asparagine substitution at position 31 (S31N) of the M2 protein, novel
H7N9 viruses are predicted to be resistant to adamantane. Therefore, this drug is not recom‐
mended for use [25].
Two neuraminidase inhibitors, Tamiflu (oseltamivir phosphate) and Relenza (zanamivir),
are influenza antiviral drugs used by health authorities against recently circulating influenza
A viruses, including H7N9 influenza viruses. However, NA inhibitors-resistant influenza
viruses  are  arising  in  clinical  settings.  Recently,  the  rate  of  oseltamivir-resistant  H1N1
viruses,  including  some  H5N1  viruses,  is  increasing  around  the  world  [47-49].  Equally
alarming, oseltamivir-resistant H7N9 virus has been reported in a clinical specimen collected
two days after commencement of oseltamivir therapy [30]. The H7N9 isolate encoding the
NA  R292K  substitution  is  highly  resistant  to  oseltamivir  and  peramivir  and  partially
resistant to zanamivir [50].
In addition to antiviral drugs, inactivated and live attenuated vaccines are available. Tradi‐
tional influenza vaccines made to protect against seasonal influenza viruses (H1N1 and H3N2
subtypes) are available. In general, vaccines need to be revised and/or developed due to
significant antigenic diversity of influenza A viruses. For example, a comparison of novel avian
influenza A(H7N9) virus with Eurasian or North American lineages of H7 subtype viruses
revealed antigenic differences (http://www.who.int/influenza/vaccines/virus/
201302_h5h7h9_vaccinevirusupdate.pdf), suggesting new vaccines need to be developed on
the basis of the HA and NA genes of H7N9 candidate vaccine stains. Of note, several new
strategies are now in various stages of development. In one example, a “universal” vaccine
focuses on regions of viral proteins that are highly conserved across virus subtypes, and
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provides broad protection against existing and newly emergent unmatched strains [51].
Antihuman C5a antibody treatment markedly reduced acute lung injury (ALI) and systemic
inflammation induced by H7N9 virus infection [52].
9. The future
Currently, new strains of influenza A virus are arising quickly and frequently around the world
due to continued evolution. In the past two years alone, at least five new subtypes of influenza
A virus: A(H7N9), A(H10N8), A(H5N8), A(H6N1), and A(H5N6), have been reported in China.
Little knowledge is known about key factors that determine reassortment, virulence, and
transmissibility of influenza virus, although much has been learned [1]. Wild birds have served
as an ecologic factor favoring emergence and maintenance of avian influenza viruses in natural
ecosystems. Therefore, careful influenza surveillance, especially at the wild bird–human
interface, remains essential for pandemic preparedness. From a scientific perspective, the
opportunity to watch virus evolution in real time may help bridge this gap of knowledge.
Author details
Wen Su and Hongxuan He*
*Address all correspondence to: hehx@ioz.ac.cn
National Research Center for Wildlife Born Diseases, Institute of Zoology, Chinese Academy
of Sciences, Beijing, China
References
[1] Webster RG, Bean WJ, Gorman OT, Chambers TM, Kawaoka Y. Evolution and ecolo‐
gy of influenza A viruses. Microbiol Rev 1992; 56 (1):152-179.
[2] Sorrell EM, Schrauwen EJ, Linster M, De Graaf M, Herfst S, Fouchier RA. Predicting
'airborne' influenza viruses: (Trans-) Mission impossible? Curr Opin Virol 2011; 1 (6):
635-642.
[3] Lam TT, Zhou B, Wang J, et al. Dissemination, divergence and establishment of
H7N9 influenza viruses in China. Nature 2015. Epub ahead of print. doi:10.1038/
nature14348.
[4] Qi X, Qian YH, Bao CJ, et al. Probable person to person transmission of novel avian
influenza A (H7N9) virus in Eastern China, 2013: Epidemiological investigation. BMJ
2013; 347:f4752.
Microbiology in Agriculture and Human Health40
[5] Yoon SW, Webby RJ, Webster RG. Evolution and Ecology of Influenza A Viruses.
Curr Top Microbiol Immunol 2014; 385:359-75.
[6] Bouvier NM, Palese P. The biology of influenza viruses. Vaccine 2008; 26 Suppl
4:D49-53.
[7] Neumann G, Noda T, Kawaoka Y. Emergence and pandemic potential of swine-ori‐
gin H1N1 influenza virus. Nature 2009; 459 (7249):931-939.
[8] Chen W, Calvo PA, Malide D, et al. A novel influenza A virus mitochondrial protein
that induces cell death. Nat Med 2001; 7 (12):1306-1312.
[9] Wise HM, Foeglein A, Sun J, et al. A complicated message: Identification of a novel
PB1-related protein translated from influenza A virus segment 2 mRNA. J Virol 2009;
83 (16):8021-8031.
[10] Jagger BW, Wise HM, Kash JC, et al. An overlapping protein-coding region in influ‐
enza A virus segment 3 modulates the host response. Science 2012; 337 (6091):199-204.
[11] Wise HM, Hutchinson EC, Jagger BW, et al. Identification of a novel splice variant
form of the influenza A virus M2 ion channel with an antigenically distinct ectodo‐
main. PLoS Pathog 2012; 8 (11):e1002998.
[12] Claas ECJ, Osterhaus ADME, van Beek R, et al. Human influenza A H5N1 virus re‐
lated to a highly pathogenic avian influenza virus. Lancet 1998; 351 (9101):472-477.
[13] Subbarao K, Klimov A, Katz J, et al. Characterization of an avian influenza A (H5N1)
virus isolated from a child with a fatal respiratory illness. Science 1998; 279 (5349):
393-396.
[14] Li KS, Guan Y, Wang J, et al. Genesis of a highly pathogenic and potentially pandem‐
ic H5N1 influenza virus in eastern Asia. Nature 2004; 430 (6996):209-213.
[15] Ducatez MF, Olinger CM, Owoade AA, et al. Avian flu: Multiple introductions of
H5N1 in Nigeria. Nature 2006; 442 (7098):37.
[16] Chen H, Smith GJ, Zhang SY, et al. Avian flu: H5N1 virus outbreak in migratory wa‐
terfowl. Nature 2005; 436 (7048):191-192.
[17] Liu J, Xiao H, Lei F, et al. Highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza virus infection in mi‐
gratory birds. Science 2005; 309 (5738):1206.
[18] Peiris JS, de Jong MD, Guan Y. Avian influenza virus (H5N1): A threat to human
health. Clin Microbiol Rev 2007; 20 (2):243-267.
[19] Olsen SJ, Ungchusak K, Sovann L, et al. Family clustering of avian influenza A
(H5N1). Emerg Infect Dis 2005; 11 (11):1799-1801.
[20] Herfst S, Schrauwen EJA, Linster M, et al. Airborne transmission of influenza A/
H5N1 virus between ferrets. Science 2012; 336 (6088):1534-1541.
Emergence and Pandemic Potential of Avian Influenza A (H7N9) Virus
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/61007
41
[21] Imai M, Watanabe T, Hatta M, et al. Experimental adaptation of an influenza H5 HA
confers respiratory droplet transmission to a reassortant H5 HA/H1N1 virus in fer‐
rets. Nature 2012; 486 (7403):420-428.
[22] Zhang Y, Zhang Q, Kong H, et al. H5N1 hybrid viruses bearing 2009/H1N1 virus
genes transmit in guinea pigs by respiratory droplet. Science 2013; 340 (6139):
1459-1463.
[23] Fraser C, Donnelly CA, Cauchemez S, et al. Pandemic potential of a strain of influen‐
za A (H1N1): early findings. Science 2009; 324 (5934):1557-1561.
[24] Dawood FS, Jain S, Finelli L, et al. Emergence of a novel swine-origin influenza A
(H1N1) virus in humans. N Engl J Med 2009; 360 (25):2605-2615.
[25] Gao RB, Cao B, Hu YW, et al. Human infection with a novel avian-origin influenza A
(H7N9) virus. N Engl J Med 2013; 368 (20):1888-1897.
[26] Shi JZ, Deng GH, Liu PH, et al. Isolation and characterization of H7N9 viruses from
live poultry markets-Implication of the source of current H7N9 infection in humans.
Chin Sci Bull 2013; 58 (16):1857-1863.
[27] Wang CM, Wang J, Su W, et al. Relationship between domestic and wild birds in live
poultry market and a novel human H7N9 virus in China. J Infect Dis 2014; 209 (1):
34-37.
[28] Lam TTY, Wang J, Shen YY, et al. The genesis and source of the H7N9 influenza vi‐
ruses causing human infections in China. Nature 2013; 502 (7470):241-244.
[29] Zhang Q, Shi J, Deng G, et al. H7N9 influenza viruses are transmissible in ferrets by
respiratory droplet. Science 2013; 341 (6144):410-414.
[30] Gao R, Cao B, Hu Y, et al. Human infection with a novel avian-origin influenza A
(H7N9) virus. N Engl J Med 2013; 368 (20):1888-1897.
[31] Liu D, Shi W, Shi Y, et al. Origin and diversity of novel avian influenza A H7N9 vi‐
ruses causing human infection: Phylogenetic, structural, and coalescent analyses.
Lancet 2013; 381 (9881):1926-1932.
[32] Massin P, van der Werf S, Naffakh N. Residue 627 of PB2 is a determinant of cold
sensitivity in RNA replication of avian influenza viruses. J Virol 2001; 75 (11):
5398-5404.
[33] Hatta M, Hatta Y, Kim JH, et al. Growth of H5N1 influenza A viruses in the upper
respiratory tracts of mice. PLoS Pathog 2007; 3 (10):1374-1379.
[34] Stevens J, Blixt O, Tumpey TM, Taubenberger JK, Paulson JC, Wilson IA. Structure
and receptor specificity of the hemagglutinin from an H5N1 influenza virus. Science
2006; 312 (5772):404-410.
Microbiology in Agriculture and Human Health42
[35] Stevens J, Corper AL, Basler CF, Taubenberger JK, Palese P, Wilson IA. Structure of
the uncleaved human H1 hemagglutinin from the extinct 1918 influenza virus. Sci‐
ence 2004; 303 (5665):1866-1870.
[36] Zhang W, Shi Y, Lu XS, Shu YL, Qi JX, Gao GF. An airborne transmissible avian in‐
fluenza H5 hemagglutinin seen at the atomic level. Science 2013; 340 (6139):1463-1467.
[37] Linster M, Boheemen S, de Graaf M, et al. Identification, characterization, and natu‐
ral selection of mutations driving airborne transmission of A/H5N1 virus. Cell 2014;
157 (2):329-339.
[38] Childs RA, Palma AS, Wharton S, et al. Receptor-binding specificity of pandemic in‐
fluenza A (H1N1) 2009 virus determined by carbohydrate microarray. Nat Biotechnol
2009; 27 (9):797-799.
[39] Zhang Y, Zhang Q, Gao Y, et al. Key molecular factors in hemagglutinin and PB2
contribute to efficient transmission of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic influenza virus. J Vi‐
rol 2012; 86 (18):9666-9674.
[40] Richard M, Schrauwen EJA, de Graaf M, et al. Limited airborne transmission of
H7N9 influenza A virus between ferrets. Nature 2013; 501 (7468):560-563.
[41] Shi Y, Zhang W, Wang F, et al. Structures and receptor binding of hemagglutinins
from human-infecting H7N9 influenza viruses. Science 2013; 342 (6155):243-247.
[42] Xiong XL, Martin SR, Haire LF, et al. Receptor binding by an H7N9 influenza virus
from humans. Nature 2013; 499 (7459):496-499.
[43] Steel J, Lowen AC, Mubareka S, Palese P. Transmission of influenza virus in a mam‐
malian host is increased by PB2 amino acids 627K or 627E/701N. PLoS Pathog 2009; 5
(1):e1000252.
[44] Organization WH. Overview of the emergence and characteristics of the avian influ‐
enza A (H7N9) virus. Available at: http://www.who.int/influenza/
human_animal_interface/influenza_h7n9/WHO_H7N9_review_31May13.pdf?ua=1.
(Accessed 2 June 2013).
[45] Gabriel G, Dauber B, Wolff T, Planz O, Klenk HD, Stech J. The viral polymerase me‐
diates adaptation of an avian influenza virus to a mammalian host. Proc Natl Acad Sci
USA 2005; 102 (51):18590-18595.
[46] Zhang Y, Zhang QY, Kong HH, et al. H5N1 hybrid viruses bearing 2009/H1N1 virus
genes transmit in Guinea pigs by respiratory droplet. Science 2013; 340 (6139):
1459-1463.
[47] de Jong MD, Tran TT, Truong HK, et al. Oseltamivir resistance during treatment of
influenza A (H5N1) infection. N Engl J Med 2005; 353 (25):2667-2672.
[48] Le QM, Kiso M, Someya K, et al. Avian flu: Isolation of drug-resistant H5N1 virus.
Nature 2005; 437 (7062):1108.
Emergence and Pandemic Potential of Avian Influenza A (H7N9) Virus
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/61007
43
[49] Poland GA, Jacobson RM, Ovsyannikova IG. Influenza virus resistance to antiviral
agents: A plea for rational use. Clin Infec Dis 2009; 48 (9):1254-1256.
[50] Hai R, Schmolke M, Leyva-Grado VH, et al. Influenza A(H7N9) virus gains neurami‐
nidase inhibitor resistance without loss of in vivo virulence or transmissibility. Nat
Commun 2013; 4:2854.
[51] Schotsaert M, De Filette M, Fiers W, Saelens X. Universal M2 ectodomain-based in‐
fluenza A vaccines: Preclinical and clinical developments. Expert Rev Vaccines 2009; 8
(4):499-508.
[52] Sun S, Zhao G, Liu C, et al. Treatment with anti-C5a antibody improves the outcome
of H7N9 virus infection in African green monkeys. Clin Infect Dis 2015; 60 (4):586-595.
Microbiology in Agriculture and Human Health44
